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Abstract 
Certain insolvency law rules, like creditors’ priorities and set-off rights, have a 
distributive impact on creditors. Distributional rules reflect the hierarchies of 
values and interests in each jurisdiction and, as a result, have high political rele-
vance and pose an obstacle to reforming the EU Insolvency Regulation. This paper 
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will show the difficulty of reform by addressing two alternative options to regulate 
cross-border insolvencies in the European Union. The first one is the ‘choice 
model’, under which companies can select the insolvency law they prefer. Although 
such a model would allow distressed firms to select the most efficient insolvency 
law, it would also displace Member States’ power to protect local constituencies. 
The choice model therefore produces negative externalities and raises legitimacy 
concerns. The opposite solution is full harmonisation of insolvency law at EU level, 
including distributional rules. Full harmonisation would have the advantage of 
internalising all externalities produced by cross-border insolvencies. However, the 
EU legislative process, which is still based on negotiations between states, is not 
apt to decide on distributive insolvency rules; additionally, if harmonisation in-
cludes such rules, it will indirectly modify national social security strategies and 
equilibria. This debate shows that the choice regarding power allocation over 
bankruptcies in the EU depends on the progress of European integration and is 
mainly a matter of political legitimacy, not only of efficiency. 
Keywords: insolvency law, COMI, forum shopping, harmonisation, political 
legitimacy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of trade and the economic integration of supranational 
territories, cross-border insolvencies become increasingly important. Indeed, insol-
vent companies can have assets and creditors in a number of states, each of which 
may claim to be competent to govern the insolvency proceedings or, at least, to 
liquidate domestic assets and protect local creditors. Therefore, the question of 
jurisdiction for insolvency cases as well as the power of such regulators is becom-
ing a central issue in the international arena. 
This issue also emerges within the European Union, where firms are increas-
ingly active as in a single market. To provide guidance on insolvency proceedings, 
the EU Insolvency Regulation of 2000.1 was enacted with the aim to coordinate 
Member States’ laws and courts’ authority. The fundamental idea of the Insolvency 
Regulation is that the Member State where a debtor has its ‘centre of main interests’ 
(hereinafter ‘COMI’) should be competent to regulate its main insolvency proceed-
ings and that these proceedings should have universal effect in all Member States. 
In recent years, the European Parliament raised the question of harmonising the 
substantive insolvency laws in the EU to cope with the continental dimension of 
many companies. The first effort was to request Insol Europe, the association of 
                                                                                                                                               
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, OJ 2000 L 160/1, 30 June 2000. 
The Insolvency Regulation does not apply to Denmark: Recital 33 Insolvency Regulation. 
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European insolvency practitioners and scholars, to deliver a report on the feasibility 
of such harmonisation (hereinafter ‘Insol Report’).2 The Report was published in 
April 2010 and, following a careful comparative overview of Member States’ 
legislations, suggested harmonising a significant portion of insolvency law. The 
Insol Report argued that the differences in insolvency rules between Member States 
incentivise firms to undertake so-called ‘forum shopping’, that is, to seek the most 
convenient insolvency law and venue regardless of the location of their assets and 
activities. According to the Report, forum shopping jeopardises transparency and 
legal predictability and decreases the chances to restructure insolvent firms.3 
In response to the Insol Report, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution re-
questing the Commission to submit one or more legislative proposals aimed at par-
tially harmonising insolvency law in the European Union and at amending the 
Insolvency Regulation.4 Consequently, the European Parliament proposed to partially 
harmonise the following issues: (a) opening of insolvency proceedings;5 (b) rules on 
the filing and verification of claims;6 (c) avoidance of fraudulent and preference 
transfers;7 (d) restructuring plans;8 and (e) insolvencies of groups of companies.9 
                                                                                                                                               
2 The Insol Report is available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/ 
studies/searchPerform.do>. 
3 Ibid., at pp. 26-27. 
4 European Parliament Resolution, with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)), 15.11.2011 (hereinafter, 
‘European Parliament Resolution’). The legal basis of such harmonisation is uncertain and the 
Resolution proposes three alternatives: (1) Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter, ‘TFEU’), which allows the Parliament and the Council to enact 
harmonisation directives to attain freedom of establishment throughout the EU; (2) Article 81 
TFEU, pursuant to which the Union can adopt measures for the approximation of Member States’ 
laws regarding judicial cooperation in civil matters with cross-borders implications; (3) Article 
114 TFEU, pursuant to which harmonising measures can be enacted with the aim to establish the 
internal market. On the legal basis for insolvency law harmonisation, see Bob Wessels, ‘Har-
monization of Insolvency Law in Europe’, 8 European Company Law (2011) p. 27, and Bob 
Wessels and Ian Fletcher, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe (Deventer, Kluwer 2012), 
at pp. 49-65. 
5 European Parliament Resolution, supra n. 4, § 1.1. See also Insol Report, supra n. 2, at pp. 
9-12, and Anna Maria Pukzsto, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level with Respect to 
Opening of Proceedings, Claims Filing and Verification and Reorganisation Plans (2011), 
available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110622ATT 
22313/20110622ATT22313EN.pdf>. 
6 European Parliament Resolution, supra n. 4, § 1.2. See also Insol Report, supra n. 2, at pp. 
15-16. 
7 European Parliament Resolution supra n. 4, § 1.3; Insol Report, supra n. 2, at pp. 18-20; see 
also Daniel Fritz, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU level: Avoidance Actions and Rules on 
Contracts (2011), available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/ 
20110622ATT22311/20110622ATT22311EN.pdf>. 
8 European Parliament Resolution, supra n. 4, § 1.5. See also Insol Report, supra n. 2, at pp. 
16-17. 
9 European Parliament Resolution, supra n. 4, Part 3. 
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Additionally, it proposed to create an insolvency register in order to provide pan-
European transparency to insolvency proceedings.10 
Significantly, however, the European Parliament did not propose to harmonise 
rules on creditors’ priorities, set-off rights and termination of executing contracts.11 
This is surprising since the recitals of the European Parliament Resolution consider 
that the current lack of harmonisation with regard to creditors’ priorities ‘reduces 
predictability of outcomes of judicial proceedings’.12 
Meanwhile, the European Commission has issued a new proposal to reform the 
Insolvency Regulation,13 which does not follow the recommendation of the Euro-
pean Parliament to partially harmonise insolvency law. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the intrinsic difficulty faced by the Euro-
pean institutions in harmonising creditors’ priorities, set-off rights and the rules on 
termination of contracts. These ‘distributional rules’ affect the equal treatment of 
creditors in the distribution of a debtor’s assets and are a politically highly sensitive 
matter as they embody a specific balance of values and interests. Reform of distri-
butional rules therefore requires a high level of political legitimacy and consensus. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section deals with the differences 
between distributional rules across jurisdictions. In the third section, I discuss two 
problematic issues of today’s EU insolvency law. On the one hand, the Insolvency 
Regulation provides for a number of exceptions to the universal application of the 
law of the COMI, revealing Member States’ desire to govern insolvencies affecting 
local interests. On the other hand, despite the Insolvency Regulation’s effort to 
avoid it, forum shopping has become increasingly feasible. In the fourth section, I 
address two alternative policy options to reform the Insolvency Regulation: to 
adopt a pure choice model, or to entirely harmonise insolvency rules, including 
distributional rules. Since distributional insolvency rules complement social secu-
rity mechanisms and reflect social balances within a certain jurisdiction, both a pure 
choice model and full harmonisation raise legitimacy concerns. 
2. GOALS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 
2.1 Goals of insolvency law 
After a company becomes insolvent, the relations among its stakeholders change 
dramatically: shareholders and creditors shift their respective economic positions 
                                                                                                                                               
10  Ibid., Part 4. 
11  The Insol Report proposed harmonising these issues as well: Insol Report, supra n. 2, at 
pp. 14-22. 
12  European Parliament Resolution, supra n. 4, Whereas A and B. 
13  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, 12 
December 2012, COM (2012) 744 final, 2012/0360 (COD). 
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and the latter become the residual claimants of corporate activities.14 In this situa-
tion, insolvency law displaces general creditors’ remedies and governs the liquida-
tion or the workout proceedings. 
The first goal of insolvency law is to limit collective action problems faced by 
creditors.15 Creditors cannot coordinate themselves and therefore rationally collect 
their debts individually and seize a debtor’s assets as soon as financial distress 
becomes apparent. From an ex ante viewpoint, this ‘race to grab’ a debtor’s assets 
is perfectly rational for individual creditors, yet, from an ex post viewpoint, it leads 
to inefficient outcomes for the creditors as a group if the going concern value of 
their debtor’s assets is higher than the sum of those assets’ individual market prices. 
In these cases, it is in the best interest of creditors to facilitate a restructuring of the 
corporation, to approve workout plans or to sell debtor’s assets in an orderly man-
ner so as to maximise their value. In order to address this ‘common pool problem’, 
insolvency law rules provide for a stay of individual creditors’ claims during the 
insolvency proceedings.16 and rank all unsecured creditors equally between them-
selves (.pari passu or par condicio creditorum).17 Additionally, individual creditors 
may reject workout or restructuring plans that would maintain the going concern 
value of the firm and would be value-enhancing for the creditors as a group, simply 
because they hope to be paid in full if the plan succeeds and all other creditors 
adhere to it (‘hold-out’ problem).18 To address this problem, insolvency regulations 
require a creditors’ majority vote to approve recovery plans that will also be bind-
ing on dissenting creditors.19 
The ability to address creditors’ coordination problems to efficiently allocate the 
debtors’ assets is certainly one of the cornerstones of insolvency law. However, 
‘real’ insolvency laws across jurisdictions pursue additional goals as they also 
redistribute assets among creditors, departing from the pure equality rule.20 This is 
one of the primary reasons why insolvency laws diverge significantly from state to 
state. For instance, in many jurisdictions, creditors’ equality suffers exceptions 
                                                                                                                                               
14  See John Armour, Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, ‘Transactions with Creditors’, in Re-
inier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, 
Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, eds., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2nd edition 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2009), at pp. 121-122. 
15  Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press 1986), at pp. 21-25. 
16  See Jay L. Westbrook, Charles D. Booth, Christoph G. Paulus and Harry Rajak, A Global 
View of Business Insolvency Systems (Washington D.C., The World Bank 2010), at pp. 69-73, 
setting out some exceptions to the general stay in different jurisdictions. 
17  See Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell 
2011), at pp. 235-240. 
18  Mark J. Roe, ‘The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts’, 97 Yale Law Journal (1987) p. 232. 
19  Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak, supra n. 16, at p. 156. 
20  Y. Rotem, ‘Pursuing Preservation of Pre-bankruptcy Entitlements: Corporate Bankruptcy 
Law’s Self-executing Mechanisms’, 5 Berkeley Business Law Journal (2008), at p. 84. 
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aimed at protecting specific classes of creditors, such as a debtor’s family, employ-
ees, creditors having a set-off right,21 or the counterparties of specific contracts. 
Another clear example is claw-back actions: insolvency laws usually nullify trans-
fers made by the debtor before its default which favour some creditors over others 
(‘preference transfers’) and transfers made at under-price (‘fraudulent transfers’),22 
yet the prerequisites of such avoidance, in particular the relevant timeframe and the 
relevance of subjective debtors’ motivation, are different from state to state and are 
usually a highly controversial issue. These rules affect the distribution of a debtor’s 
assets among creditors and reflect different policy goals pursued by governments 
and policy makers.23 
2.2 Creditors’ priorities and the redistributive function of insolvency 
law 
Pre-insolvency bargains and entitlements between a debtor and its creditors are 
generally respected, so that secured creditors enjoy priority over unsecured ones. 
The economic reason behind pre-insolvency entitlement protection is that secured 
creditors’ priorities limit borrowers’ moral hazard and, as a consequence, expand 
the availability of credit and reduce its cost.24 However, the very regulation of 
secured credits might diverge across jurisdictions regarding the ranking of secured 
lenders in relation to other creditors: some insolvency laws curb the original credi-
tors’ entitlements by reducing secured creditors’ priorities, carving out or exempting 
portions of assets realisation, or limiting self-enforcement of the security.25 
More commonly, insolvency laws rank unsecured credits unequally by granting 
certain creditors specific ‘privileges’ or priorities over other unsecured creditors. In 
this way, insolvency regulation alters ex post the balance between stakeholders as 
compared to their original positions, with the aim of protecting certain classes of 
creditors in case of a company’s default. A classic example of unsecured creditors’ 
                                                                                                                                               
21  For a summary of some carve-outs regarding the general stay of creditors’ claims, see Insol 
Report, supra n. 2, at p. 12. On the relevance of insolvency rules to state policies, see Paul J. 
Omar, European Insolvency Law (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing 2004), at pp. 6-9. 
22  At the same time, certain transfers that are made by a firm in financial distress, with the 
aim to continue its operations, are often excluded from avoidance, otherwise the firm would have 
no chance of recovery. 
23  See Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 University of Chicago Law Review (1987) 
p. 775; José Garrido, ‘The Distributional Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects’, 4 
International Insolvency Review (1995) p. 27; John Armour, ‘The Law and Economics of Corpo-
rate Insolvency: An Overview’, Centre for Business Research, Working Paper No 197 (2001), at 
p. 8; Goode, supra n. 17, at pp. 72-79. 
24  Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit and the Harmonisation of Law (Edward Elgar 2011), 
at pp. 55-57. 
25  Rotem, supra n. 20, at p. 84; Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak, supra n. 16, at pp. 16-
21. 
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priorities is employees’ claim for due wages and social contributions. These claims 
often enjoy priority over those of other creditors, although the extent and ranking of 
such priority vary between jurisdictions.26 Another example is Member State claims 
for due taxes: in some jurisdictions, such claims enjoy priority over unsecured 
credits or even super-priority over all creditors.27 
In general, a tension emerges between the interests of prioritised creditors and 
those of other creditors, both secured and unsecured. Insolvency rules prioritising 
certain classes of creditors damage other unsecured creditors, who risk not recover-
ing anything from a debtor’s estate after secured creditors and prioritised ones have 
been paid.28 Although the strategy to protect certain classes of creditors via insol-
vency rules is often understandable socially and politically, it also produces signifi-
cant drawbacks, as this task is partially put on other creditors’ shoulders. Each 
jurisdiction decides whether and how to curb pre-insolvency entitlements in order 
to protect certain stakeholders through specific priorities or privileges.29 This is a 
politically relevant decision that reflects a hierarchy of interests within a specific 
jurisdiction.30 
Specific classes of creditors can also be protected through tax-paid social secu-
rity mechanisms or through mandatory insurances, instead of via insolvency law. 
The equilibrium between distributive insolvency law rules and other social security 
strategies varies between states and is also a politically relevant decision. For 
instance, insolvency laws that do not redistribute value among creditors might be 
compensated by strong social security mechanisms.31 By contrast, redistributive 
insolvency rules might counterbalance weaknesses of social security institutions or, 
alternatively, reinforce the impact of strong social security mechanisms.32 
                                                                                                                                               
26  Jay Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’, 33 Texas International Law Journal (1998) p. 27, at 
p. 30; John A. Pottow, ‘Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and 
Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”’, 10 Michigan Law Review (2006) p. 1899, at p. 1903; 
Paul Omar, ‘The Challenge of Diverse Priority Rules in European Insolvency Laws’, Eurofenix, 
Autumn 2011, p. 32. For an overview, see Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak, supra n, 16, at 
pp. 184-195. Few jurisdictions, however, prioritise employees’ claims over secured creditors. In 
the European Union, employees’ claims for due wages have priority (at least in part) even over 
secured credits under French law (Article L.625-8 Code de commerce) and Greek law (Statute 
3588/2007, Article 154 et seq.). 
27  See Andreas Piekenbrock, ‘Insolvenzprivilegien im deutschen, ausländischen und eu-
ropäischen Recht’, 122 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess (2009), at pp. 75-76. 
28  Garrido, supra n. 23, at p. 32; Goode, supra n. 17, at p. 250. 
29  See Westbrook, Booth, Paulus and Rajak, supra n. 16, at p. 188-189. 
30  Garrido, supra n. 23, at p. 34, and José Garrido, ‘No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distribu-
tional Question in International Bankruptcies’, 46 Texas International Law Journal (2011), at p. 474. 
31  For example, in Germany, employees are paid together with common creditors and are 
fully compensated by a social fund financed by the employers (Insolvenzgeld: Drittes Sozialge-
setzbuch § 3(4); §§ 165 et seq.; §§ 323 et seq.). 
32  This seems to be the case in France, where workers’ super-priority is coupled with strong 
social security protection. For an overview of theories of institutional complementarities, see John 
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Distributional insolvency rules, however, are not always equivalent to efficient 
welfare state and social security mechanisms. In this respect, the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide to cross-border insolvencies stressed that 
[s]ome priorities are based on social concerns that may be addressed more read-
ily by law other than the insolvency law, such as social welfare legislation, than 
by designing an insolvency law to achieve social objectives that are only indi-
rectly related to questions of debt and insolvency. Providing a priority in the in-
solvency law may at best afford an incomplete and inadequate remedy for the 
social problem, while at the same time rendering insolvency proceedings less 
effective.33 
This is made clear by considering employees’ protection in the EU. Pursuant to the 
Directive on Employees Protection, Member States must create institutions that 
guarantee the payment of employees’ outstanding claims in case of an employer’s 
default, unless ‘other forms of guarantee’ offer the employees ‘a degree of protec-
tion equivalent to that resulting from’ the Directive.34 In this regard, it is highly 
debated whether insolvency priorities offer that degree of protection. A good exam-
ple of this doubtful equivalence is provided by claims of merchant seamen for 
payment of due wages. In the UK, their protection is exclusively based on the 
maritime liens arising from the International Convention on Maritime Liens and 
Mortgages,35 which prioritise seamen’s claims over those of both secured and 
unsecured creditors; nonetheless, the European Commission has held that such a 
lien ‘may not always offer a degree of protection equivalent to that of the’ UK 
National Insurance Fund, which does not apply to seamen.36 
                                                                                                                                               
Campbell, ‘The US Financial Crisis: Lessons for Theories of Institutional Complementarity’, 9 
Socio-Economic Review (2011) p. 211. 
33  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, at p. 271 (2005). 
34  Article 1(2) Directive 2008/94/EC of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in 
the event of the insolvency of their employer (hereinafter, ‘Directive on Employees Protection’), 
which codifies Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of insolvency of 
their employer as amended by Directive 2002/74/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 23 September 2002. See also Article 8 of the ILO Convention on the Protection of Workers’ 
Claims, 1992 (of the EU Member States, only Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain ratified this Convention): ‘National laws or regulations shall give 
workers’ claims a higher rank of privilege than most other privileged claims, and in particular 
those of the State and the social security system. However, where workers’ claims are protected 
by a guarantee institution […], the claims so protected may be given a lower rank of privilege 
than those of the State and the social security system.’ 
35  International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1993, Article 3. 
36  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementa-
tion and application of certain provisions of Directive 2008/94/EC on the protection of employees in 
the event of the insolvency of their employer, 28.2.2011, COM (2011) 84 final, at p. 3. 
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In order to understand its effects, insolvency law cannot be separated from the 
web of social and legal relations in which it is embedded. As we have seen above, 
an absolute priority for secured creditors ex ante increases the amount of credit and 
reduces its cost. This strategy, however, conflicts with other interests, such as those 
of employees and small creditors, and might impede a debtor’s recovery or disin-
centivise firm-specific commitments of workers and commercial partners.37 In turn, 
legislation that prioritises unsecured credits over secured ones also comes at a 
social cost, since it can increase the cost of credit or discourage banks to concede 
loans. In other words, a trade-off exists between different policy goals and interests; 
policy makers strike a balance between such interests and goals according to their 
own policy options and strategies. This explains some of the differences between 
insolvency laws across countries, which also derive from different economic needs, 
voters’ heterogeneous preferences and corresponding political decisions. 
2.3 Political economy of insolvency law 
As a result of the redistributive impact of insolvency rules, different groups of 
creditors and stakeholders.38 have diverging views as to the proper purposes of 
insolvency proceedings.39 To be sure, all interest groups are likely to share some 
common goals, namely that the competent court and the insolvency trustee or 
liquidator act fast and efficiently, and that insolvency law addresses coordination 
problems among creditors. However, the interests of sophisticated creditors, such as 
banks and financial institutions (hereinafter ‘adjusting creditors’), usually diverge 
from those of non-sophisticated ones (hereinafter ‘non-adjusting creditors’) in 
regard to other issues. 
Adjusting creditors can take the risk of a debtors’ default into account in the in-
terest rates or can require securities, such as a lien, a pledge or a contractual cove-
nant. Consequently, they advocate insolvency legislations that respect pre-
insolvency entitlements and allow them to enforce their debts during insolvency 
proceedings. Regarding the avoidance of fraudulent and preference transfers, 
adjusting creditors, having a strong influence on debtors’ pre-insolvency behaviour, 
prefer rules that restrict avoidance, in order to limit the risk that courts nullify 
payments made and guarantees granted before the insolvency. 
                                                                                                                                               
37  Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy’, 105 Yale Law Journal (1996), at pp. 885-887. 
38  Besides creditors, we should also mention the position of managers who lobby for legisla-
tion that does not displace them during the insolvency and that limits their risk of liability and 
derivative actions for mismanagement or wrongful trading. See Barry E. Adler, ‘Financial and 
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy’, 45 Stanford Law Review (1992-1993), at 
pp. 343-344. 
39  Troy A. McKenzie, ‘Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts’, 62 
Stanford Law Review (2010), at pp. 774-775. 
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By contrast, non-adjusting creditors,40 who do not have a similar bargaining po-
sition, advocate legislation that curbs pre-insolvency entitlements to their advan-
tage, limits secured creditors’ priorities and rights, and increases avoidance of 
payments made in the vicinity of insolvency.41 Among non-adjusting creditors, it is 
useful to distinguish employees, who are integrated into the business together with 
other productive factors. Employees are likely to make firm-specific investments, 
so that their risk is highly undiversified and job losses affect them and their families 
more than commercial creditors.42 Therefore, employees advocate insolvency 
legislations that grant them priority for all due wages, that do not interrupt the 
employment contract and that favour a restructuring of the firm. 
These conflicts of interests become even more prominent if the defaulted com-
pany has assets, creditors or suppliers in many jurisdictions. Each of these states 
has a political interest in regulating the insolvency, even if the debtor is incorpo-
rated elsewhere. We can imagine the case of a company incorporated in country A 
and having all its assets, activities and creditors in country B. In this situation, 
country B is more affected than country A by this firm’s default and, additionally, 
the courts or insolvency trustee of country A will face significant obstacles in 
seizing assets located in country B. 
In this scenario, different interest groups are likely to sponsor diverging solu-
tions as to the applicable insolvency law and the reach of courts’ powers. Non-
adjusting creditors and employees have a strong interest in insolvencies being 
governed by domestic courts and rules, which they can influence through democ-
ratically elected representatives. Adjusting creditors, by contrast, can protect them-
selves with an adequate contractual covenant or securities, or can take the risk of 
default and the risks associated with the applicable insolvency law into account in 
the price of credit. Consequently, their primary interest is to predict which court 
will be competent and what will be the applicable law in case of a debtor’s de-
fault.43 Additionally, they will sponsor any solution that allows maintaining the 
validity of pre-insolvency securities. 
                                                                                                                                               
40  However, things might be more complicated whenever some non-adjusting creditors are 
able to pool classes of debtors together and apply to them the same interest rate or the same price 
(‘weak non-adjusting creditors’): Andrew T. Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defense of 
Universalism’, 98 Michigan Law Review (1999-2000) p. 2177. 
41  Bebchuk and Fried, supra n. 37, at pp. 882-887: legislations that respect pre-insolvency bargains 
and proprietary guarantees distribute value among creditors to the advantage of secured creditors. 
42  Goode, supra n. 17, at p. 250. 
43  Miguel Virgos and Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 
Council of the European Union, Doc. 6500/96/EN (1996), para. 75: ‘Insolvency is a foreseeable 
risk. It is therefore important that international jurisdiction […] be based on a place known by the 
debtor’s potential creditors.’ See also Horst Eidenmüller, ‘Der Markt für internationale Konzern-
insolvenzen: Zuständigkeitskonflikte unter der EuInsVO’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2004), 
at p. 3456, and idem, ‘Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law’, 6 European 
Business Organization Law Review (2005), at p. 429; Bob Wessels, Current Topics on Interna-
tional Insolvency Law (Kluwer 2004), at p. 160. 
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3. INSOLVENCY LAW IN THE EU: FROM THE GOAL TO AVOID FORUM 
SHOPPING TO A CHAOTIC CHOICE MODEL 
As reported in the first section, Member States where debtors have their COMI are 
competent to govern their main insolvency proceedings, and the law of the state of 
the COMI applies to all of a debtor’s assets and creditors, regardless of their loca-
tion.44 In particular, the state of the COMI is competent not only to govern the 
insolvency proceedings, but also to regulate distribution criteria.45 The Insolvency 
Regulation specifies that the COMI is in the place where the debtor ‘conducts the 
administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by 
third parties’.46 Consequently, a debtor’s COMI is likely to be in the Member State 
where most of its stakeholders are located and which is therefore the most inter-
ested in governing a debtor’s insolvency. These rules were meant to form a well-
ordered system granting clarity and legal certainty. A closer look, however, reveals 
that the application of the Insolvency Regulation is quite different from its original 
official goals. On the one hand, the Regulation provides for numerous exceptions to 
the law of the COMI in order to deal with the interests of other Member States in 
regulating specific ‘local’ issues. On the other hand, the evolution of EU case law 
on companies’ freedom of establishment and the Cross-Border Merger Directive of 
2005 have allowed different forms of forum shopping to creep in. 
3.1 Exceptions to the powers of the state of the COMI 
Despite the fact that the Insolvency Regulation follows the universality principle, 
the regulatory powers of the state of the COMI suffer a number of carve-outs and 
                                                                                                                                               
44  On the principle of universality, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in 
Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum’, 65 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 
(1991) p. 457; Lucian A. Bebchuk and Andrew T. Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational 
Bankruptcies’, 42 Journal of Law and Economics (1999) p. 775; Guzman, supra n. 40. 
45  Article 4(2) Insolvency Regulation. Additionally, all actions deriving from an insolvency, 
such as board liabilities for delaying the filing for insolvency and wrongful trading, should be 
governed by courts of the state of the COMI: European Court of Justice, C-133/78 Gourdain v. 
Nadler [1979] R-I 733 (on the French action en comblement du passif.); European Court of 
Justice, C-330/07, Frick Teppichboden Supermärkte GmbH v. Deko Marty Belgium B [2009] 
ECR I-767 (the courts of the State of the COMI are competent in respect of avoidance actions); 
European Court of Justice, C-444/07 MG Probud Gdnia sp. z. o.o. [2010]. See Alexander Schall, 
‘The UK Limited Company Abroad – How Foreign Creditors Are Protected After Inspire Art’, 16 
European Business Law Review (2005) p. 1553; Luca Enriques and Martin Gelter, ‘Regulatory 
Competition in European Corporate Law and Creditor Protection’, 7 European Business Organi-
zation Law Review (2006), at p. 440. We must be aware, however, that characterisation differ-
ences can still arise across the EU: Stefania Bariatti, ‘Filling the Gaps of EC Conflicts of Laws 
Instruments: The Case of Jurisdiction over Actions Related to Insolvency Proceedings’, Liber F. 
Pocar (Milan, Giuffrè 2009) p. 23. 
46  Recital 13 Insolvency Regulation. 
186 Federico M. Mucciarelli EBOR 14 (2013) 
exceptions that favour Member States where certain assets, stakeholders or activi-
ties are located. The underlying logic is that another Member State is ‘closer’ to the 
interests involved (or to some of them) than the state of the COMI. Politically, these 
carve-outs signal that Member States are reluctant to entirely defer to others the 
regulation of specific issues or of proceedings having a significant ‘local’ impact. 
The first and most significant exception to the competence of the state of the 
COMI is the power granted to Member States where the debtor has an ‘establish-
ment’ to open secondary proceedings with territorial effects and liquidation pur-
poses.47 Secondary proceedings exclusively follow the insolvency rules and 
creditors’ priorities of such a Member State.48 This mechanism, usually labelled as 
‘modified universalism’, is a pragmatic solution to the main obstacle in the way of 
full acceptance of universalism, namely the different creditors’ priorities across 
jurisdictions.49 This compromise, however, is also, per se, a significant breach in the 
logic of the universality principle.50 and a big concession to the ‘territoriality’ idea,51 
according to which the state where a debtor’s assets are located should sbe compe-
tent to govern their liquidation and distribution to creditors.52 Indeed, after the 
opening of secondary proceedings, assets located in the Member States where these 
proceedings have been commenced are not available under the main proceedings 
and are to be distributed according to creditors’ priorities set by the Member State 
of establishment.53 The very opening of secondary proceedings may therefore 
disrupt the effectiveness of the main proceedings. 
Major flexibility would be achieved if the courts of the main proceedings could 
apply the distributive rules of the state of establishment to assets and creditors 
                                                                                                                                               
47  Article 2 Insolvency Regulation. See Gerard McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and 
Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’, 68 Cambridge Law Journal (2009), at pp. 174-175. 
48  Article 28 Insolvency Regulation. 
49  Garrido, supra n. 30, at p. 470. 
50  See Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (London, OUP 2005), at p. 
371; Sefa M. Franken, ‘Three Principles of Transnational Corporate Bankruptcy Law: A Review’, 
11 European Law Journal (2005), at p. 235. 
51  Frederick Tung, ‘Is International Bankruptcy Possible?’, 23 Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2001), at p. 77. 
52  In support of the territoriality principle, see Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in Interna-
tional Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’, 84 Cornell Law Review (1998-1999), at p. 
722, and idem, Courting Failure (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 2005), at p. 209. 
53  The opening of secondary proceedings can be used to contrast the implementation of main 
proceedings. See, for example, the insolvency of the Illochroma group: Illochroma Italia s.r.l. was 
an Italian company incorporated in Ivrea and belonging to the insolvent French Illochroma group. 
The Tribunal of Commerce of Roubaix stated that the COMI of Illochroma Italia s.r.l. was located 
in France, although all its assets, plants and commercial activities were in Italy. As a reaction, the 
Tribunal of Ivrea decided to open secondary proceedings against the same company: Corte 
d’Appello Torino, 10/3/2009, Il Fallimento (11/2009), at p. 1296. 
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located there. This solution was adopted in the British Collins & Aikman case,54 
where the administrator of a holding company having subsidiaries in other Member 
States committed himself with local creditors of such states to respecting their 
distributive rules and to partially disregarding UK priorities. Courts of other Mem-
ber States, however, do not enjoy a similar degree of flexibility. The recent pro-
posal of the European Commission to reform the Insolvency Regulation explicitly 
codifies the rule in Collins & Aikman as it enables liquidators to commit themselves 
to respecting ‘distribution and priority rights which local creditors would have had 
if secondary proceedings had been opened’.55 This solution is flexible and prag-
matic but is a further limitation of the universality principle, underlining how 
Member States are still protecting their own creditors’ priorities. 
Furthermore, the Insolvency Regulation provides for a number of carve-outs, 
which limit the exclusive power of the state of the COMI to set the rules on credi-
tors’ equality.56 In most cases, the competence of the state of the COMI is excluded 
with regard to a debtor’s assets located in the territory of another Member State. 
This is the case for rights in rem over a debtor’s assets,57 reservation of title,58 
contracts related to immovable properties,59 rights subject to registration (regarding 
which the law of the state of the register prevails)60 and third parties’ purchase of 
certain kinds of assets.61 Some of these carve-outs are aimed at respecting pre-
insolvency entitlements and displace the power of the state of the COMI to modify 
them. For instance, rights in rem,62 such as a pledge or other securities, over a 
debtor’s assets situated in a Member State different from the state of the COMI 
cannot be disregarded by the competent court.63 Following this rule, securities 
qualified as right in rem over a moveable asset, such as a pledge, or over a collec-
tion of assets, such as floating charges, are to be respected in the insolvency pro-
                                                                                                                                               
54  Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA [2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch). See Gabriel Moss, ‘Group In-
solvency – Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience Under the Influence of English 
Pragmatism’, 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2008), at pp. 1017-1018. 
55  Reform Proposal, supra n. 13, Article 28(a), amending Article 18(1) of the Insolvency 
Regulation. 
56  McCormack, supra n. 47, at p. 175. 
57  Article 5 Insolvency Regulation. 
58  Article 7 Insolvency Regulation. 
59  Article 8 Insolvency Regulation. 
60  Article 11 Insolvency Regulation. 
61  Article 14 Insolvency Regulation. 
62  On the characterisation as ‘rights in rem’, see Michael Veder, Cross-border Insolvency 
Proceedings and Security Rights (Kluwer 2004), at pp. 332-336 (who makes a case for independ-
ent interpretation); Fletcher, supra n. 50, at p. 406 (autonomous characterisation by each Member 
State); Omar, supra n. 21, at pp. 161-164. 
63  Article 5 Insolvency Regulation, which, however, does not set a conflicts rule and does not 
establish which law is to be applied: Goode, supra n. 17, at p. 768; Christoph Paulus, Europäische 
Insolvenzverordnung. Kommentar, 4th edn. (Frankfurt a.M., Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft 2010), 
at p. 164. 
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ceedings if the assets are located in another Member State, with the consequence 
that creditors’ priorities established by the state of the COMI do not apply.64 
The conflict of law criterion to be applied to claw-backs of pre-insolvency 
transactions is even more significant. As we have seen above, the general principle 
is that the law of the COMI also regulates avoidance actions,65 yet transactions 
subject to the law of another Member State remain valid if such law ‘does not allow 
any means of challenging the act in the relevant case’.66 The rationale is protection 
of trust, under the premise that contractual parties rely on the application of avoid-
ance rules of the law regulating the contract. In practice, however, this rule favours 
adjusting creditors that can impose the application to lending contracts of a law that 
restricts avoidance.67 
To be sure, not all exceptions to the law of the COMI aim at protecting sophisti-
cated creditors. Significantly, the law governing employment contracts regulates 
the effects of insolvency proceedings on such contracts as well. This carve-out 
applies exclusively to contractual issues, such as whether and under what circum-
stances the insolvency trustee must continue the employment contract or can termi-
nate it.68 By contrast, the state of the COMI governs creditors’ ranking, including 
employees’ priorities, regardless of the law applicable to the contract, while the law 
of the state where the employees carry out their work is competent to regulate any 
payment of social securities or state guarantees for unpaid due wages.69 
3.2 Corporate mobility and regulatory arbitrage regarding insolvency 
law 
One of the goals of the Insolvency Regulation is to avoid forum shopping and 
regulatory arbitrage.70 In order to pursue this goal, the Insolvency Regulation relied 
upon two implicit premises: that European corporations did not significantly ex-
pand their activities outside their home country, so that their COMI could be easily 
determined, and that companies could not ‘reincorporate’ from one Member State 
to another without liquidating. These premises are no longer realistic due to the 
evolution of European economic integration and of EU law on freedom of estab-
lishment. 
Indeed, European corporations have increasingly extended their activities 
throughout the whole territory of the European Union. This fact is to be celebrated 
as a success of market integration policies, aimed at achieving a single internal 
                                                                                                                                               
64  Veder, supra n. 62, at p. 342. 
65  Article 4(2)(m) Insolvency Regulation. 
66  Article 13 Insolvency Regulation. 
67  See Insol Report, supra n. 2, at p. 19. 
68  See Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law (Kluwer 2012), at pp. 621-622. 
69  Article 9(1) Directive on Employees Protection. 
70  Recital 4 Insolvency Regulation. 
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market in the EU. At the same time, the continental extension of the activities of 
European companies increases uncertainties as to the location of their COMIs due 
to the fuzziness of this standard.71 To be sure, in order to simplify its determination, 
a company’s COMI is presumed to be in the Member State of the registered office, 
unless the contrary is proven.72 The goal of this rule is to increase predictability ex 
ante, since creditors need to know which law will be applied in case of insolvency 
so that they can take the ‘value’ of that law into account in the price of credit. The 
presumption that the COMI coincides with the registered office, however, only 
provides legal predictability if divergences between the registered office and the 
‘real’ COMI are rare.73 and if cross-border mobility of the registered office is im-
possible or extremely difficult. Both premises are no longer realistic on account of 
the evolution of EU law and to ECJ case law. 
Due to the ECJ’s decisions after the Centros case in 1999, a company’s head-
quarters can be located in a Member State different from the state of incorporation 
(provided that the latter accepts this dissociation).74 Therefore, companies can 
conduct their business entirely from a Member State different from the state of 
incorporation.75 In these cases, the company’s COMI is in the Member State where 
the headquarters is, provided that this is ascertainable by third parties; however, the 
                                                                                                                                               
71  Franken, supra n. 50, at pp. 251-254; Massimo Benedettelli, ‘ “Centro degli interessi prin-
cipali” del debitore e forum shopping nella disciplina comunitaria delle procedure di insolvenza 
transfrontaliera’, Rivista italiana di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (2004), at pp. 
525-528 (stressing that, despite the wording in Recital 4 of the Insolvency Regulation, the COMI 
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Role of Multinational Institutions’, 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2007), at p. 764; 
Gerard McCormack, ‘Reconstructing European Insolvency Law – Putting in Place a New Para-
digm’, 30 Legal Studies (2010), at pp. 129-133. 
72  Article 3 Insolvency Regulation. As a result, if this presumption is not rebutted, the same 
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Law: EC Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition’, 58 Current Legal Problems (2005), at pp. 
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dem Gesellschaftsrecht’, 61 Der Betrieb (2008) p. 2523. 
73  See Virgos-Schmit Report, para. 75, supra n. 43: ‘the registered office normally corre-
sponds to the debtor’s head office’. 
74  European Court of Justice, C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] 
ECR I-1459; European Court of Justice, C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919; European Court of Justice, C-167/01, 
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-1095. 
75  Eidenmüller, ‘Free Choice’, supra n. 43, at p. 430; Gabriel Moss and Christoph Paulus, 
‘The European Insolvency Regulation – The Case for Urgent Reform’, 19 Insolvency Intelligence 
(2006), at p. 3; McCormack, supra n. 47, at p. 191. On the impact of corporate mobility on the 
applicable insolvency law, see also Sebastian Mock, ‘Gläubigerschutz in der Europäischen 
privatgesellschaft zwischen Gesellschafts- und Insolvenzrecht,’ Der Konzern (2008), at pp. 542-
544; Mathias M. Siems, Leif Herzog and Erik Rosenhäger, ‘The Protection of Creditors of a 
European Private Company’, 12 European Business Organization Law Review (2011) p. 147. 
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presumption that a corporation’s COMI coincides with its registered office points in 
the opposite direction, and the burden to overcome such presumption might be 
considerable. Additionally, conflicts of jurisdiction are governed by the ‘priority 
principle’, according to which ‘[a]ny judgment opening insolvency proceedings 
handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article 3 shall be recognised in all the other Member States’;76 therefore, if a court 
of the state of incorporation opens insolvency proceedings, courts of other states 
can only open secondary territorial proceedings, since there is no effective and 
binding legal mechanism to challenge the decision of the first court. 
On top of that, reincorporations throughout the EU have become feasible in the 
last years, despite the lack of a specific directive.77 The main reason is that, in 2005, 
a Directive was enacted regulating cross-border mergers: these are now viable, 
though costly and time-consuming, mechanisms to transfer the registered office 
from one Member State to another by incorporating a shell company and then 
merging into it.78 Eventually, a decision of the ECJ has declared that freedom of 
establishment grants companies the right to reincorporate from one Member State 
to another, yet this statement was probably obiter dictum.79 At the moment, al-
though some Member States, such as the UK and Germany,80 still do not allow 
                                                                                                                                               
76  Article 16 Insolvency Regulation. On the effects of the priority principle, see Thomas 
Bachner, ‘The Battle over Jurisdiction in European Insolvency Law’, 7 European Company and 
Financial Law Review (2006), at p. 318, and Luca Enriques and Martin Gelter, ‘How the Old 
World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European Corpo-
rate and Bankruptcy Law’, 81 Tulane Law Review (2007), at pp. 635-637. 
77  The Proposal for a Directive on the cross-border transfer of registered office was eventu-
ally dismissed: Impact Assessment on the Directive on the Cross-border Transfer of Registered 
Office, Brussels, 12.12.2007 SEC (2007) 1707. See, however, European Parliament Resolution of 
2 February 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on a 14th Company Law Directive on 
the cross-border transfer of company seats (2011/2046(INI)), and the Report of the Reflection 
Group on the Future of EU Company Law, 5 April 2011, at pp. 17-20, available at: <http://ec. 
europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf>. 
78  If the country of arrival follows the real seat theory, the emigrating company also needs to 
transfer its headquarters; by contrast, if the country of arrival does not require domestically 
incorporated companies to also have their headquarters in the same territory, foreign companies 
can simply reincorporate there without transferring any physical assets or the headquarters. 
79  European Court of Justice, C-210/06, CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató [2008] ECR I-
09641. See António Frada de Sousa, ‘Company’s Cross-border Transfer of Seat in the EU After 
Cartesio’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 07/09, and Andrzej W. Wi?niewski and Adam 
Opalski, ‘Companies’ Freedom of Establishment After the ECJ Cartesio Judgment’, 10 European 
Business Organization Law Review (2009) p. 595; Stefano Lombardo, ‘Regulatory Competition 
in Company Law in the European Union After Cartesio’, 10 European Business Organization 
Law Review (2009) p. 627. 
80  Legal practitioners, however, have found a way to avoid such prohibition; for an account, 
see Marc-Philippe Weller, ‘Die Verlegung des Centre of Main Interest von Deutschland nach 
England’, 37 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht (2008), at p. 863, and 
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reincorporations, many others, such as France, Spain and Italy, do.81 After reincor-
porating from one Member State to another, a company’s COMI is presumed to be 
in the Member State of the new registered office. The relevant moment to deter-
mine the COMI is exclusively the filing for insolvency, even if the debtor trans-
ferred its registered office before the insolvency.82 Consequently, if a company 
succeeds in reincorporating in another Member State, it indirectly selects the appli-
cable insolvency law, unless creditors provide evidence that the COMI is still in the 
original state. 
Although the original intention of the Regulation was to avoid forum shopping, 
the evolution of EU law has changed the legal scenario and has converted the 
Insolvency Regulation into a hybrid, which, to a certain extent, allows forum 
shopping. It is increasingly common for corporations to dissociate their activities 
and headquarters from the registered office or to transfer their registered office 
abroad,83 the result being that the presumption of coincidence between COMI and 
registered office does not produce the same effects as envisaged by the drafters of 
the Insolvency Regulation.84 However, creditors can provide convincing evidence 
that the COMI is still in the original country.85 In sum, the European model allows 
debtors to indirectly influence the choice of competent venue, yet does not grant 
legal certainty and predictability. 
4. THE REFORM OF THE INSOLVENCY REGULATION AND ITS POLITICAL 
DIMENSION 
This section addresses two opposite solutions to the reform of cross-border insol-
vency in the European Union: to entirely harmonise insolvency law, including rules 
on creditors’ priorities, or to allow companies to select the insolvency law they 
prefer (‘choice model’). Although neither has been proposed by the EU institutions 
in their efforts to amend the present regime, analysis of both is necessary to shed 
light on any future development. 
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4.1 Choice model 
4.1.1 The case for the choice model in the European Union 
A number of legal scholars reject harmonisation of insolvency law and suggest 
regulating regulatory arbitrage and forum shopping in a transparent way, instead of 
denying their existence (as the Insolvency Regulation now does). This solution is 
supported by efficiency motivations. Under a choice model, companies would not 
be trapped into inefficient domestic proceedings and could choose another Member 
States’ law if they considered it more efficient than the domestic law or if such 
proceedings allowed a restructuring that would be impossible under the original 
law.86 In other words, corporations would take advantage of the legal diversity 
across the EU and could avoid inefficient and slow domestic regulations and pro-
ceedings.87 
Indeed, some cases of successful regulatory arbitrage are reported whereby dis-
tressed corporations managed to move the registered office and the COMI to an-
other Member State to take advantage of workout mechanisms not available under 
the original law; in the two most significant, and most cited, of these cases, German 
companies managed to convert into English ones in order to enter into a debt-equity 
swap and to facilitate the approval of workout plans by creditors.88 
In order to implement a choice model in the EU, two alternative solutions are 
available. The first option is to allow free choice of insolvency law, regardless of 
the applicable company law (‘unbundled free choice’). A different solution, how-
ever, has gained more consensus among legal scholars, namely to replace the 
COMI with the registered office as choice of law and choice of forum criterion.89 
Consequently, newly established companies, by incorporating under the law of a 
certain Member State, would implicitly choose the applicable insolvency law as 
                                                                                                                                               
86  Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies’, 19 Michigan Jour-
nal of International Law (1997-1998) p. 1, and idem, ‘Resolving Transnational Insolvencies 
Through Private Ordering’, 98 Michigan Law Review (1999-2000) p. 2252; Eidenmüller, ‘Free 
Choice’, supra n. 43, at p. 429; Franken, supra n. 50, at pp. 241-246; Ringe, supra n. 80, at p. 601. 
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Demarcation Principle and the Emergence of European Private Law’, 5 Maastricht Journal of 
European Law (1998) p. 140. 
88  See Weller, supra n. 80, at p. 863; Ringe, supra n. 80, at pp. 585-586. 
89  See Armour, supra n. 72, at pp. 407-408; Eidenmüller, ‘Free Choice’, supra n. 43, at p. 
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well. Under both versions of the choice model, insolvency law would be predictable 
ex ante, so that creditors can anticipate the rules in the cost of credit or in the 
contract.90 This solution may also contribute to reducing the cost of credit, since 
debtors will not choose insolvency regulations that ‘systematically shift wealth 
from creditors to shareholders’.91 Under such premises, therefore, the choice model, 
by allowing shareholders and directors to transparently select the preferred insol-
vency law, would also increase overall efficiency. 
4.1.2 Drawbacks of the choice model 
Despite these strong arguments, however, a choice model has some weaknesses, 
since it would not be neutral towards the interests of the stakeholders involved. To 
understand how free choice of insolvency law can affect creditors’ interests, it is 
necessary to distinguish midstream changes of applicable insolvency law from the 
original choice made at the moment of incorporation. In the following analysis, I 
address a ‘pure’ choice model, where there is just one competent jurisdiction and no 
exceptions to the universality principle. 
4.1.2.1 Midstream changes of applicable insolvency law 
Under the choice model, companies would be allowed to change the originally 
applicable insolvency law by shifting their registered office to another state. As we 
have seen, insolvency rules have redistributive effects among corporate stake-
holders and are not neutral towards creditors’ interests. Therefore, by changing the 
applicable insolvency law, a debtor would modify its risk profile, which creditors 
took into account in the contractual conditions. Ex ante, adjusting creditors would 
protect themselves through adequate covenants or guarantees, or by raising the cost 
of credit. 
Non-adjusting creditors, however, risk suffering from a debtor’s opportunistic 
change of law.92 To resolve this problem, legislations must grant existing creditors 
either the right to receive a guarantee, or the right to be paid in advance if their 
debtors change the applicable insolvency law.93 Such creditor protection mecha-
nisms are already provided for in the Cross-Border Merger Directive, which re-
quires Member States to implement ‘provisions and formalities’ for the ‘protection 
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of creditors of the merging companies’.94 In implementing this provision, many 
Member States grant pre-existing creditors the right to oppose the merger or to 
obtain a security. In order to fully protect pre-existing non-adjusting creditors in a 
choice model, such creditors’ protection mechanisms should be extended to cross-
border transfers of registered offices as well.95 
In other words, midstream forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage raise policy 
issues that can be resolved through adequate legal mechanisms that protect credi-
tors. If these safeguards are in place, potentially damaged creditors will always be 
rewarded, so that the efficiency gains produced by midstream changes of insol-
vency law outweigh their costs and there is no reason to ban such transactions.96 
4.1.2.2 Choice of applicable insolvency law at the moment of incorporation 
The original selection of the applicable insolvency law raises far more concerns. 
Due to the development of ECJ case law on freedom of establishment, companies 
can run their business entirely from a Member State different from the state of 
incorporation, if this state so allows.97 Therefore, if the registered office replaces the 
COMI, companies can select the preferred insolvency jurisdiction at the moment of 
incorporation, regardless of the location of the assets, creditors and employees. For 
example: the insolvency of an English Ltd whose business is exclusively in Ger-
many would be governed by English courts and by English insolvency law and 
creditors’ priorities. 
According to a widespread view, as long as this initial choice of law is made in 
a transparent way, future creditors cannot be harmed because they anticipate the 
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applicable insolvency law in the contractual conditions or in the interest rate.98 
Consequently, no negative externalities and inefficiencies can ever arise from the 
initial choice of the applicable insolvency law. 
However, only adjusting creditors can take account of the applicable insolvency 
regime in the contractual conditions and have sufficient resources at their disposal 
to lodge their claims in another jurisdiction.99 By contrast, non-adjusting creditors, 
such as involuntary creditors, employees or small trade partners, cannot anticipate 
the applicable law in the contractual conditions and cannot protect themselves 
through diversification. Additionally, the cost of lodging their claims in another 
jurisdiction hinges on the price of legal services and on lawyers’ fees, which di-
verge significantly across Member States.100 and are likely to be onerous for small 
creditors. 
The most relevant problem regarding the initial choice of insolvency law is re-
lated to priority regimes. As we have seen above, priority regimes are a highly 
political matter, intertwined with national social security policies, and convey a 
hierarchy of interests and values. Under a pure choice model, the priority regime of 
the Member State selected by the insolvent company would apply to all creditors 
throughout the European Union. The competent Member State would lay down 
distributive insolvency rules according to its own balance of interests and hierarchy 
of values, which would also affect other Member States’ local constituencies. It is 
realistic to argue that adjusting creditors would press their debtors or potential 
debtors into selecting an insolvency regime that grants them unrestricted priority 
rights, even if the proceedings are inefficient or do not facilitate a debtor’s recov-
ery.101 If companies could only select the insolvency law together with the applica-
ble company law, sophisticated lenders would induce the founders of newly 
established companies to incorporate in Member States that ‘over-prioritise’ their 
claims, while non-adjusting creditors located in other Member States would be at 
the mercy of this initial choice. This is a typical ‘spillover effect’ that risks generat-
ing negative externalities and resources misallocation.102 On top of that, this out-
come raises legitimacy concerns and would face significant political opposition. 
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4.1.2.3 Can we fix the choice model? 
We can conclude by stating that a ‘choice model’ has a number of advantages, as it 
allows shareholders and directors to select the most efficient regulation. Yet, it also 
comes at a significant social cost and raises legitimacy concerns. 
Can we imagine a compromise solution that keeps the advantages of the choice 
model and, at the same time, allows Member States to protect local non-adjusting 
creditors? Such a compromise would require carving out distribution rules from 
general insolvency law,103 for instance, granting the Member State of a debtor’s 
centre of main interests the competence to govern creditors’ priorities and claw-
back actions; additionally, the law governing employment and tenancy contracts 
should regulate the continuation of such contracts during insolvency proceedings, 
even if the general proceedings are governed by a different Member State selected 
by the debtor. 
However, this solution would raise a number of problems due to the difficulty of 
disentangling redistributive insolvency rules from the rest of insolvency law. First 
of all, rules on creditors’ priorities and asset exemptions are intertwined with 
workout proceedings. The main reason for this intertwining is that, in order to 
convince banks and other financial institutions to finance rescue proceedings, post-
insolvency commencement lenders have to be prioritised over pre-existing creditors 
if the rescue attempt fails.104 Therefore, it seems extremely difficult to dissociate the 
rules on workout proceedings from those governing creditors’ priorities. Similarly, 
avoidance actions related to fraudulent and preferential transfers can be difficult to 
carve out from general insolvency law. Such carve-outs would raise great uncer-
tainties as to the applicable law and as to whether certain transactions can be 
avoided in case of a debtor’s default. This uncertainty would ultimately raise the 
cost of credit or induce banks to ration it. 
4.2 Full harmonisation 
4.2.1 The case for harmonising insolvency law in the European Union 
As we have seen, the choice model has a number of advantages, yet its social costs 
can be difficult to reduce. Therefore, policy makers need to explore the option of 
harmonising insolvency law in the EU. 
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tions in order to maximise their collective demand for goods. See Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. 
Rubinfield, ‘Federalism’, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of 
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Harmonised insolvency law would be a remedy against negative externalities 
produced by domestic legislations of Member States. Under the Insolvency Regula-
tion, the law of the Member State of a debtor’s COMI applies to assets and credi-
tors located in other Member States, which can produce negative externalities and 
spillover effects. Such externalities would be even more pronounced by adopting 
the choice model and by replacing the COMI with the registered office. Following a 
public welfare approach, the solution to spillover effects is to grant the regulatory 
competence to the political body that is affected most by externalities.105 This 
approach therefore poses a strong argument in favour of harmonisation. 
Nor is the principle of subsidiarity, which underpins EU law, an obstacle in the 
way of full harmonisation: the subsidiarity principle justifies harmonisation if a 
certain issue is better and more efficiently regulated at the EU level, due to the need 
to internalise negative externalities.106 
By harmonising insolvency law, the highest possible authority, corresponding to 
the continental dimension of the debtor’s activities, would regulate all defaults and 
thus internalise all negative externalities.107 Most importantly, EU policy makers 
would take into account the interests of non-adjusting creditors so as to gain their 
political support. In order to avoid spillover effects, creditors’ priorities and asset 
exemption need to be harmonised as well.108 If identical rules applied throughout 
the EU, independently of the location of the assets or the company’s registered 
office, regulatory arbitrage and forum shopping at the expense of creditors would 
be banned and all creditors would know in advance, and with certainty, which rules 
apply in case of their debtor’s default. 
4.2.2 Drawbacks of full harmonisation 
However, harmonisation is not always the best option, even in regard to issues that 
produce significant externalities, if populations’ preferences are heterogeneous 
across Member States. In these cases, smaller territorial units may be better 
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equipped to address local interests and needs.109 In general, a trade-off exists be-
tween efficiency gains produced by harmonisation and inefficiencies produced by 
the distance of the decision maker from people’s heterogeneous preferences. 
To find out whether this trade-off has positive or negative net effects with re-
gard to insolvency law harmonisation, and in particular harmonisation of distribu-
tional rules, we should therefore look at the EU legislative mechanisms. The 
outcome is that full harmonisation of insolvency law is probably not feasible under 
the present structure of European institutions. In particular, the so-called ‘democ-
ratic deficit’110 of European institutions and the dynamic of the EU decision-making 
process raise doubts as to whether the EU political bodies are appropriate to enact 
redistributive insolvency rules. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, harmonisation instruments should be adopted following the ordinary 
legislative procedure.111 which involves negotiations between the Commission – 
which also has the power to submit the proposal – the Council and the European 
Parliament. This procedure mirrors the dual basis of democratic legitimacy in the 
institutions of the European Union, involving both the Member States and the 
citizens.112 Furthermore, the Council shall act by qualified majority vote, which is a 
complicated mechanism aimed at combining the need for big Member States to 
vote according to the size of their population with the need for small states not to be 
always outvoted.113 Therefore, the voting mechanism involves negotiations between 
Member States and induces them to seek broad consensus.114 As a result, harmoni-
sation of distributional insolvency rules is likely to protect strong interest groups 
that are able to bargain at the highest EU level.115 
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It may be expected that, if creditors’ interests become sufficiently homogeneous 
throughout the EU, there will be no obstacle to full harmonisation of insolvency 
law. Presently, however, only banks, financial institutions and, perhaps, trade 
unions have sufficient influence to bargain at EU level. As a result, regarding 
distributional rules, one may reasonably expect that harmonised insolvency law will 
respect pre-insolvency entitlements and priorities (which is the primary interest of 
banks and sophisticated lenders, as we have seen above.116.), with the sole exception 
of employees’ claims, which are likely to be prioritised. In other words, a fully 
harmonised EU insolvency law is likely to cancel all creditors’ priorities, with the 
sole exception of those of employees, and, in this way, to alter national balances of 
security mechanisms and hierarchies of values and interests. 
What would be Member States’ reaction so such a scenario? The first possible 
reaction might be to convert the original nationally based creditors’ priorities into 
statutory liens, namely rights in rem, which are likely to be respected even in case 
of full harmonisation of insolvency law. However, this strategy is useful only for 
debts somehow related to assets located in the territory of the same Member State, 
not for other credits. Therefore, in a fully harmonised insolvency regime, Member 
States that want to maintain the original hierarchy of interests and values will 
protect specific classes of creditors through welfare state mechanisms or other 
social securities, which can be either insurance-based or financed by taxpayers. 
This outcome is not inefficient per se, yet reveals a significant obstacle in the 
way of full harmonisation. Indeed, harmonisation of distributional insolvency rules 
would indirectly influence social security strategies, which are considered as be-
longing to Member States’ exclusive competence.117 This is the most fundamental 
obstacle to harmonisation of distributional rules. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has stressed that distributive insolvency rules, such as creditors’ priori-
ties, asset exemptions and set-off rights, complement national social security poli-
cies and are an expression of hierarchies of values and interests that, at present, are 
in the exclusive hands of Member States. 
Under a ‘choice model’ for insolvency law, whereby companies can select the 
insolvency law they prefer, social preferences of the jurisdiction selected by the 
debtor will be imposed on stakeholders located in other Member States. This is a 
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typical spillover effect, which can produce negative externalities and raises a 
significant question of political legitimacy. A possible solution to such externalities 
is unification or harmonisation of law, yet this solution also has weaknesses, for full 
harmonisation of insolvency law, including redistributive and socially sensitive 
rules, would alter existing balances in national social security mechanisms and 
strategies. 
At the present stage of development of EU institutions, there is no optimal solu-
tion to the issue of power allocation in respect of bankruptcies, especially regarding 
rules on asset distribution. The reason is that this issue is not a matter of efficiency 
only: the ‘optimal’ solution has much more to do with politics and with the devel-
opment of European integration. 
